摘要
股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。
As the reform of non-tradable shares was done,the wealth of shareholders has turned to be determined by the stock price.The controlling shareholders holding plenty of non-tradable shares have incentives to manage the earnings to maximize their interests.There is a restriction for the state-owned Stock Rights Transferring,which leads to less incentive to manage the earnings for the state-owned controlling shareholders than the others.Therefore,this paper investigates the reform of non-tradable shares has different effects on the state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies respectively.We find after the reform of non-tradable shares,as for non-state-owned listed companies,the degree of upward earnings management significantly increases and the earnings persistence significantly decreases.However,result shows there is no significant change for state-owned listed companies in these two aspects.We test the consequence of the reform of non-tradable shares,and our finding has implications for minority investors to make investment decisions.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第8期40-48,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"公司治理
审计师选择与审计治理效应"(批准号:70872004)
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(批准号:NCET-07-0024)的研究成果
