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地区差距、财政分权与中国地方政府规模 被引量:25

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摘要 本文根据中国28个省区市1978-2004年省际面板数据,采用总量和人均财政支出分权指标,以Brennan和Buchanan(1980)与Oates-Wallis's(1988)的财政分权假设和共谋假设为基础,检验了中国的财政分权与地方政府规模之间的关系。研究发现,财政分权以及政府共谋程度的提高都导致了地方政府规模的扩大。
作者 孙群力
出处 《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第7期56-61,共6页 Finance & Trade Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"地方政府规模及其收敛性的实证研究"(70750001) 教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目"影响中国地方政府规模的因素研究"(08JA790134)的资助
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参考文献19

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