摘要
本文通过建立一般性理论模型,解释了在政治控制条件下,政治家与经理人的共同作用而产生的国有银行不良资产过程。具体而言,本文说明了政治家的代理问题主导银行不良资产Ⅱ型产生,而银行经理人的道德风险问题则是形成银行不良资产Ⅲ型的原因。在政治控制下,随着信息不对称导致的道德风险问题的恶化,银行不良资产将不断累积,呈现发散的趋势。政府不得不对银行巨额的不良资产进行财政补贴,而这一补贴最后将通过增加税收或通货膨胀的方式由社会公众承担,这是一种在经济和政治上具有高昂成本、长期而言不可持续的模式。该结论不仅对我国银行业的未来改革具有价值,而且对当前发达国家政府向金融机构注资持股及银行国有化同样有意义。
Nationalization and political control over banks become a global trend in the recent financial crisis. Under the circumstances it is meaningful to study long term social cost of political control over banks, although it seems inevitable to have government intervention in bank to stabilize financial market in short run. This paper establishes a general theoretical model to explain bad assets of banks generated through interactions of politicians and bank managers. In specific, the paper reveals that agency problem of politicians is the main cause of bad assets type Ⅱ in banks, while moral hazard of bank managers responsible for bad assets type Ⅲ. Under political control, moral hazard problem is most likely to worsen off and demonstrates a diverging tendency. At least government has to keep providing subsidy to banks, but finally the fiscal burden will be shifted to public via tax hike or money-printing. Politically and economically, it is a very costly and non-sustainable model in long term. This conclusion is not only meaningful for China＇s bank reforms in the future, but also has implication to most developed countries in the recent full- fledged bailout and nationalization campaigns over banks.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期73-82,158,共11页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(08&ZD050)
重点项目(08AJY045)的资助
关键词
政治控制
财政补贴
道德风险
不良资产
Political Control
Fiscal Subsidy
Moral Hazard
Bad Assets
