摘要
控股股东代理是公司治理领域出现的新问题,已有一些论文对控股股东侵占方式和侵占程度进行了探讨,但目前还没有针对控股股东代理成本的定量研究.通过建立实物期权模型,考虑到控股股东控制权和现金流权的不同配置情况,分析计算了控股股东的代理成本.模型研究结果认为,相对于控制权私利而言,控股股东代理成本仍处于一个较低的水平.研究同时发现,随着控股股东现金流权比例的增加,代理成本逐渐降低;随着两权分离系数的增加,代理成本逐渐增加.数值模拟同时也证明了控股股东确实存在激励效应和侵占效应.
The agency of controlling shareholder is a new field in corporate governance research, and the methods of entrenchment of controlling shareholder have been researched in some papers, but the agency cost of controlling shareholder agency has not been quantitatively researched yet. By building real options models and considering the different allocation of control rights and cash flow rights, the agency cost of controlling shareholder agency is analyzed. Result shows that the a- gency cost have a lower level compared with private benefit controlling. At the same time with the increase of cash flow rights of controlling shareholder the agency cost decreases, with the increase of separation of the control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholder the agency cost increases. A numerical simulation also testifies the existenc of the incentive effects and entrenchment effects .
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第2期156-163,共8页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100)
广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划课题资助项目(080-07)
汕头大学文科科研基金资助项目(SR08004)
关键词
控股股东
利益侵占
代理成本
实物期权
controlling shareholder
benefit entrenchment
agency cost
real options
