摘要
虽然各国法律(比如公司法)赋予了董事会广泛的功能,但主流学术讨论的基本上都是处于经典代理理论框架下,以至于仅仅揭示出董事会的监督功能,并断言董事会监督功能越强,公司价值越高。然而,大量证据显示,上述断言并非总是真实情况。这就促使我们有必要超越传统视角,更全面地审视董事会功能,即董事会还要为管理层提供互补性的知识和能力,从而扮演建议者的角色。这种新角色不仅有利于要更准确地认识董事会制度及其安排,而且也有利于更科学地制定相关政策。
Why does the board exist？ What are the functions of the board？ This paper points out that the orthodoxy is based on principal-agent approach, so that they only look board as monitor and explore the relevant institutional principles. However, many recent empirical studies find that the actual arrangements of board do not accord with mainstream theories. Hence, it is necessary to go beyond the orthodoxy in order to understand the board more comprehensively. Besides moni- toring, the board can actually undertake productive role （advising） by providing complement knowledge and skills to management. The argument is supported by more and more evidences. These studies make us more rigorously valuating the efficiency of the actual board arrangement; furthermore help us avoiding some inappropriate legislation.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期56-63,74,共9页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
杨瑞龙教授主持的国家自然基金项目"现代企业的知识管理与治理结构安排"(70472067)
杨其静主持的全国优秀博士论文作者专项资金项目的阶段性成果
关键词
董事会
监督
建议
Board
Monitoring
Advising
