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粮食直补:中央、地方政府与农民的博弈分析 被引量:3

Direct Food Subsidy:Game Analysis on Central and Local Governments and Farmer
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摘要 文章针对粮农与地方政府对粮食补贴政策表现出的不同程度的漠视现象,应用博弈理论的分析方法,通过分析政府与粮农、地方政府与中央政府、地方政府与地方政府等不同利益主体在博弈过程中的策略选择,得出基层政府的发放成本以及粮农的种植风险补偿是影响粮补政策实施效率的两大制约因素。研究结论对粮食补贴政策的实施以及在保证政策实施效率上具有一定的参考价值。 Based on the disregard of food subsidy by grain farmers and local governments, this paper employed the game theory to analyze the strategic choices adopted by government and grain farmers,lo- cal government and central government, local government and local government in the game process. It is concluded that the payment cost of grass-roots governments and the compensation of risk of plant by grain farmers are the two most important constraint factors influencing the efficiency of food subsidy policy. This paper has certain guiding significance to the implementation of the subsidy policy as well as its guarantee of the efficiency.
作者 关青
出处 《华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2009年第2期1-4,共4页 Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词 粮食直补 政府 农民 博弈 direct food subsidy government farmer game
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