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中国改革的新政治经济学 被引量:3

New Political Economy of Chinese Reform
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摘要 一个符合"卡尔多—希克斯改进"标准的改革方案,将可能因利益不一致性,而无法被采纳;解决这一困境的办法是做实"卡尔多补偿",使方案符合"帕累托改进";而要做实"卡尔多补偿",改革受益者的事前承诺并不可信,只能依赖于国家承诺。中国改革促进了经济增长,是符合"卡尔多—希克斯改进"标准的,但也遇到了利益不一致问题。在此背景下,由于利益相对受损者并没有及时得到补偿,加之贴现率太高,因而坚持后续改革的积极性下降;而既得利益者则由于预期后续改革将轮到他们分担更多成本,因而也变得保守起来。由此导致了所谓"改革冷漠症"出现。解决此问题的办法是国家及时关注社会公平正义的再分配政策,使改革成果为大众所共享。 It is possible that a reform project in accord with Kaldor-Hicks improvement standard cannot be adopted because of Heterogeneity of Interests. The way to resolve this dilemma is to fulfill Kaldor's Compensation to make the project accord with Pareto Improvement. As the vested interesters' precommitement is not credible, the fulfillment of Kaldor's Compensation can only rely on State's commitment. China's Reform which is in accord with Kaldor-Hicks improvement standard has boosted the growth of economy. Yet it is facing the problem of Heterogeneity of Interests. In this context, people whose interests were comparatively damaged were not compensated in time, and their discount rate is too high. Therefore, their enthusiasm to support further reform is diminishing. Vested interesters also turn conservative because they anticipate that it will be their turn to share more costs if the reform goes further. Thus, there appeared the so-called symptom of reform apathy among them. The resolution of this dilemma is that the State should adopt a reallocation policy which timely highlights social justice and equality so that the outcome of the reform can be shared by all people.
作者 卢周来
出处 《开放导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第2期9-13,共5页 China Opening Journal
关键词 卡尔多——希克斯改进 利益不一致性 中国改革 Kaldor-Hicks improvement Heterogeneity of Interests China's Reform
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