摘要
基于控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离,通过构造实物期权模型,本文研究了企业技术创新投资选择过程中控股股东与中小股东之间的委托代理关系。模型分析结果显示,基于自身价值最大化,控股股东对不确定技术投资的选择主要决定于不确定性技术投资的现金流,只有当现金流达到临界值之时,才会选择不确定性的创新技术投资。同时,控股股东的现金流权、两权分离系数以及投资的风险性都会改变该临界值的大小。文章最后讨论了本文研究结论的政策含义。
Based on the separation of controlling shareholders＇ control rights and cash flow rights, the principle-agent relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in technology innovation selection has been studied through building the real option models. Result shows that the selection of controlling shareholders on technology lies on the cash flow of uncertain technology which maximizes controlling shareholders＇ value. Uncertain technology will be selected when the cash flow comes to critical value. On the same time, controlling shareholder＇s cash flow rights, separation of control rights and the risk of investment can change the critical value of technology selection. The policy meanings of the research conclusion are discussed in the last part of the paper.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2008年第4期95-99,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100)
教育部博士点基金项目
关键词
控股股东
技术创新
实物期权
controlling shareholders
technology innovation
real options
