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准纵向一体化、关系治理与合约履行——以农业产业化经营的温氏模式为例 被引量:161

The Quasi-vertical Integration,the Governance by Relations and the Performance of Contracts
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摘要 受农产品特性和交易复杂性的约束,农业产业化经营的"公司+农户"组织方式在破解分散经营的小农户生产与大市场之间的冲突难题时,面临订单履约率不高的窘境。订单履约率在不同的"公司+农户"模式中表现有所差异。本文的案例研究显示,温氏与农户形成的是紧密型的准纵向一体化的关系,呈现出对农户生产实行准车间化管理、畜禽产权归公司所有、双方对半分享合作剩余和交易以流程价格结算等特征。温氏借助信任、互惠、灵活性、声誉机制和有效沟通等关系治理机制,不仅降低与农户的交易成本,而且促进双方合作互动,保证交易顺利进行,提高合约履行绩效,实现公司与农户双赢发展的目标。 Restricted by the characteristics of agricultural products and the complexity of trading,the organizations that operate in the way of 'company plus farmers' are facing the dilemma of contract enforcement rates when resolving the conflicts between the decentralized production management of small farmer-households and the large markets. The rates of fulfillment of orders vary in different patterns of 'a company plus farmers' organizations. The results of our case reveal that the Wens(Wen is a family name in China)and farmers have formed a close relationship of quasi-vertical integration,which presents the following attributes:(1)the quasi-workshop-ization type of management of farmers' production,(2)the property right of livestock and poultry belonging to the company,(3)both sides sharing equal surplus from their cooperation,(4)transactions being settled at process prices. By means of the mechanism of trust,mutual benefit,adaptability and reputation and the mechanism of control by relationship such as effective exchange of ideas,the Wens not only have reduced the costs of business deals with farmers,but also they have spurred the cooperation and interaction between the two sides in order to guarantee the success of trade,increase the achievements of the fulfillment of contracts and reach their goals of the win-win development of both the company and farmers.
作者 万俊毅
出处 《管理世界》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第12期93-102,共10页 Journal of Management World
基金 广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目<关系治理与农业订单的履行:"农业龙头企业-农户"联盟的治理机制研究>(07JDXM63002)
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