摘要
基于公私合作的监管视角,笔者先后使用无限期重复博弈模型和KMRW声誉模型,来解释私营企业声誉对公私合作提供公共产品机制的影响。声誉缺失可能引致公共基础设施运营使用绩效低下,政府的补贴达不到激励的目的,以至于公共产品数量供给短缺或质量下降。政府可以通过建立声誉激励机制与惩戒机制,加大声誉的机会成本,引导私营企业提高、维持声誉,以达到强化其自我约束、自我监督的目的。
From the perspective of supervision of public and private partnership, the authors uses first indefinite repetitive games model and then KMRW reputation model to explain the impact of private business＇reputation on the mechanism for public and private partnership providing public goods. Loss of reputation may lead to the low performance of the public infrastructure operation and government subsidy can not achieve its incentive purpose,which results in the quantity shortage and quality decline of public goods supply. The government can construct a reputation incentive mechanism and reprimand mechanism to increase the opportunity cost of the reputation, and lead the private business to improve and maintain its reputation to achieve the purposes of self - restraint and self - supervision.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期19-22,共4页
Economic Survey
基金
陕西省教育厅科研计划项目(2005JK101)
关键词
公私合作
补贴支付
声誉博弈
public - private parternership
subsidy payment
reputation game
