摘要
渠道冲突管理是渠道管理的重要内容,而渠道冲突管理的核心是设计有效的渠道成员激励机制。本文通过建立渠道成员激励的委托代理模型,得到渠道成员努力水平可以观测和不可观测下的最优激励合同,并对边际产出、成本系数、绝对风险规避程度、不确定性随机变量方差等因素对渠道成员激励机制的影响进行探讨。
The channel conflict management is an important part of channel management and effective incentive mechanism design is the core issue of channel conflict management. A incentive model of channel member based on principal-agent theory is discussed in this paper. By calculating, the optimal incentive contracts are given when the effort level of channel member can be investigated or not. The influence of marginal production, coefficient of cost, level of absolute risk reversion, variance of uncertain random variable on incentive mechanism is explored.
出处
《数理统计与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期975-978,共4页
Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
基金
国家教育部人文社科基金(07JC630037)
镇江市软科学课题(RK2008045)
关键词
委托代理理论
渠道冲突
激励机制
principal-agent, channel conflict, incentive mechanism
