摘要
作为一种融入了更多市场精神的治理工具,合同制被当代政府在公共服务中广泛运用,其目的在于更有效地提供公共物品和服务。然而,政府合同治理并非万能。由于存在着信息非对称、信息不完全、机会主义和合同内在不完备等因素,以及合同的市场化逻辑与政府的公共属性之间存在必然冲突,政府合同治理将产生一系列委托—代理风险问题。理性思考如何应对政府合同治理所面临的各种风险,对于提高政府治理的绩效具有重要意义。
As one instrument of government with more market spirit, today contract governance is extensively used in public service delivery in order to provide public goods and services effectively and enhance the effectiveness of government. But contract governance in government is not always omnipotent. For the sake of the weaknesses of incomplete information, opportunism, incomplete contract, and the inevitable conflicts between the logic of market-orientation of contract and the public attribute of government, contract governance in government will produce a series of principal-agent problems. Therefore, it is necessary and important for us to analyze all kinds of risks of contract governance rationally, which will contribute to the improvement of public sector performance.
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2008年第5期676-680,共5页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
基金
国家留学基金资助出国留学(2007102894)
关键词
政府合同
治理
委托-代理
风险
制度
contract institution
contract governance in government
principal--agent
risk
Institution
