摘要
从委托代理理论视角探讨高校与高校辅导员之间存在的利益博弈关系,并提供相应的激励模型,希望通过设计合理的激励机制,减少信息的不对称性和委托代理链的长度,并引入竞争机制,选拔优秀人才等方式构建高校辅导员的激励机制。
This article discusses benefit gambling relations in the view of principal - agent theory between universities and the university instructors to provide the corresponding drive model. Through the rational design of incentive mechanism, reduction of the information dissymmetry and the princlpal-agent chain＇s length, the authors proposes the competitive system and talents selection to construct university instructor＇s talents incentive mechanism.
出处
《药学教育》
2008年第4期7-9,共3页
Pharmaceutical Education
关键词
辅导员
激励机制
委托代理
Instructors
Motivation Mechanism
Principal-agent
