摘要
文章通过区分所有者为知情和不知情两种类型,分析了转型经济中知情的控股股东与管理层合谋与监管问题。研究表明:在所有者都不知情的条件下,所有者监管的概率取决于监管成本、监管收益以及管理者可能进行合谋的概率;而管理者合谋的概率取决于合谋收益、所有者监管概率以及合谋失败后所带来的损失和惩罚;在所有者分为知情的内部大股东和不知情的、分散的外部小股东的时候,知情的监管者因为有合谋带来的收益,将会降低其监管的主动性,使合谋的概率上升。
Through differentiating the proprietors to two types, this article analyzes the collusion and supervision problems between hold- ing shareholders and managers who know all information in transitive economy. The researches indicate that under condition of the proprie- tors not knowing any information, their supervision probability rest on the supervision cost, income and collusion probability of the manag- ers which lies on the collusion incomes, proprietors＇ supervision probability and the losses and punishes brought by the defeated collu- sion. When the proprietors are differentiated to inside - big shareholders and outside - small dispersive shareholders who don＇ t know any information, the supervisors will reduce their supervision because of the incomes brought by collusion and make the collusion probability ascended.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2008年第8期145-148,共4页
East China Economic Management
关键词
监管
合谋
知情
不知情
supervision
collusion
know-information
unknown-information
