期刊文献+

控股股东类型与公司价值:来自上市公司的证据 被引量:2

Controlling Right and Corporate Value:Evidence from Listed Companies
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摘要 本文建立了一个状态依赖模型,分析了不同股权类型下公司价值与控股股东所持股权比例之间的关系。当政府控股时,公司价值与控股比例存在左高右低的U型曲线关系;私人控股时,公司价值与控股比例存在横S型曲线关系。利用上市公司的数据检验结果显示,政府相对控股还是绝对控股并对公司价值没有显著差异,家族相对控股比绝对控股更有利于公司价值的提升,而其他类型控股者在居于绝对控股地位后会更加关注控制权的共享收益而非剥夺其余股东。 By adopting a state-dependent model, this paper aims to figure out the relationship between corporate value and holding ratio of controlling shareholder of different types. Two conclusions are drawn: when the government is controlling, the relationship is an uneven U-shaped curve (with left higher than the right); when the private sector is controlling, the relationship is a horizontal S-curve. By statistical analysis using data from listed companies, it shows that whether the government has relative or absolute controlling rights does not significantly influence the level of corporate value. However, corporate value will increase when the family relatively rather than absolutely controls the firm, while other investors still have the major stake.
作者 吴刚 刘丹
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第8期65-72,共8页 Securities Market Herald
关键词 控制权比例 股权类型 公司价值 Share holding ratio, types of ownership, corporate value
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献86

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