摘要
由于许多基础项目融资有较大的市场风险,私人投资者会要求政府提供相应的担保,这些担保增加了政府的风险。为了有效降低政府担保的风险,本文提出了基于LPVR机制的风险分担策略,分析了特许协议中的政府目标,论证了LPVR机制能实现特许协议的社会最优化,并与固定特许协议进行了比较研究,最后,分析了LPVR机制的特点及应用。
Because market risk exists in many infrastructure project financing, private investor asks government to provide guarantees. These guarantees result in risk for government. The paper proposes the risk allocation strategy based on LPVR concession mechanism. It analyzes the government aim in concession contract. It demonstrates that LPVR mechanism can realize the social optimization of concession contract. It compares LPVR mechanism with fixed term concession contract, Finally, it analyzes the characteristics and application of LPVR.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期113-117,共5页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70573045)
关键词
基础项目融资
政府风险担保
LPVR特许机制
社会最优化
infrastructure project financing
government risk guarantee
LPVR mechanism
social optimization
