摘要
和平解放后西藏草场制度发生了若干次大的变动,其中,有的是强制性制度变迁,有的是诱致性制度变迁,总体上看,诱致性制度变迁一般都取得了较优的绩效,如家庭草场承包经营责任制。但由于制度的边际效用是递减的,表现出了一定的不足和缺陷。文章通过对西藏牧区草场制度变迁的回顾。从制度经济学角度,分析西藏草场制度变迁的动力和原因,为当前牧区草场制度的进一步创新和发展提供思路。
A number of great changes have occurred in the grassland institutions since 1951, some being forced and others induced. On the whole, induced institutional changes, e. g, , the family contracted responsibility system, usually achieved better eficiency. However, because of the decreasing nature of the institutional marginal utility, the responsibility system cannot be the last arrangement of the grassland institutional changes in Tibet. The essay discusses the motive and the causes of the reform, tempting to provide some practical ways to the further reform of the policy.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2008年第7期35-39,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
四川大学"985"工程"南亚与中国藏区创新基地"和教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(编号:06JJD850008
负责人:杨明洪)资助
关键词
西藏草场制度
制度变迁
制度绩效
思路创新
grassland institution in Tibet
institutional change
institutional efficiency
thought innovation
