摘要
本文对2000—2004年我国发生控制权转移的国有控股上市公司在控制权转移前后的经营绩效、代理成本进行了实证检验。结果表明:控制权转移后,公司的代理成本水平下降,经营绩效得到提高;卖方为地方的子样本代理成本的下降和经营绩效的改善大于卖方为中央企业的子样本;买方为民营的子样本的代理成本的下降和经营绩效的改善大于买方为国有的子样本;买方为国有的控制权转移经营绩效提高和代理成本下降主要来自最终控制人变更子样本。
This paper empirically investigates the performance and agency cost of state holding takeover targets in Chinese listed companies during 2000 to 2004. The results show that managerial performance is improved and agency cost decreases on.the whole after post corporate control transfer. Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets sold by local government are larger than those of targets sold by central state owned enterprises. Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets purchased by private owners are larger than those of targets purchased by state owned entities. Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets purclaased by state owned entities mainly come from the sub-sample of ultimate control changed.
出处
《技术经济》
2008年第5期115-120,128,共7页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70572054)
