摘要
本文基于风险决策和保险经济理论讨论了巨灾风险的转移机制和可保性,分析了私人部门在巨灾风险转移上的创新及其缺陷。认为高交易成本和信息不对称是阻碍巨灾风险保险的重要原因,而私人部门的创新机制也存在很大的缺陷。基于行为经济学分析了投保人的非理性决策问题。在全面分析私人巨灾失灵的基础上,在总结中提出了政府参与巨灾计划的优势及其重要性。
This paper analyzes some aspects of economics about catastrophe risk transfer and its insurability, and finds that information asymmetry is the key factor affecting catastrophe insurance. The innovations of private sector do not solve the basic problem. Irrational decision of policyholders affects the demand of catastrophe insurance and the failure of private catastrophe market leads to the discussion of the advantage and importance of public intervention.
出处
《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2008年第2期101-107,共7页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition
关键词
巨灾风险
风险转移机制
私人巨灾市场
政府巨灾计划
catastrophe risk
risk transfer mechanism
private catastrophe market
government catastrophe plan