摘要
建立政府与民营企业之间的博弈监督模型,并求其混合Nash均衡解,结果表明,可通过减少民营企业未履行社会责任时的预期收益和降低政府监管成本、提高监管效率来促使民营企业履行社会责任。因此,应制定适合我国国情的民营企业社会责任标准;加大对违规企业的管理和处罚力度,并建立全方位、多渠道的综合监管体系;同时,还应呼吁社会公众的广泛参与。
Through establishing the gambling supervision model between the government and private enterprises, and obtaining the mixed Nash equilibrium solution, a conclusion can be drawn that the social responsibilities of private enterprises can be urged to implement by reducing their expected gains when the private enterprises do not carry out their social responsibilities and by reducing governmental supervising cost and by improving supervising efficiency. Thus, social responsibility standard of private enterprises suitable for the situation of China should be established to deepen the penalties on the law-violated private enterprises so that all-round, multi-channel and comprehensive supervising system can be established, meanwhile, the masses should be encouraged to participate in the system.
出处
《重庆工商大学学报（西部论坛）》
2008年第2期94-96,共3页
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:West Forum
基金
福建省教育厅科研基金项目(JA06150S)
莆田市科研基金项目[2006S10(1)]
关键词
民营企业
企业社会责任
政府监管
监管成本
博弈
private enterprises
social responsibility of enterprises
government supervision
supervising cost
gamble
