摘要
道德判断的基础是实践理性的基本问题。目的论主要有两派:一派是亚里士多德的幸福主义,另一派是边沁和密尔的功利主义,它们都主张道德判断的基础在于某种功利或幸福;义务论主要指以康德为代表的道德理论,康德认为道德判断的基础不在于功利或幸福,而在于道德规则的普遍形式。罗尔斯与哈贝马斯继承了康德的传统,提出道德规范的正当性在于取得人们的普遍赞同;而麦金太尔继承了亚里士多德的传统,主张正当的问题应当依据共同体的善来确定。在后形而上学的条件下,道德判断的基础在于人的尊严。
Basis of moral judgment is a basic problem of practical reasoning. There are two teleological genies which take either utilities or happiness as the basis of moral judgment： one is Aristotelian eudemonism, the other is Bentham and Mill＇s utilitarianism. Deontology mainly refers to Kantian moral theory, which holds that the basis of moral judgment is not utilities or happiness, but the universal form of moral rules. Rawls and Habermas inherit Kantian tradition and hold that the rightness of moral rules should depend on people＇s unanimous agreement whereas MacIntyre inherits Aristotelian tradition and holds that the rightness of moral rules should depend on the goodness of community. In the era of postmetaphysics, human＇s dignity should be the basis of moral judgment.
出处
《山西师大学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期1-5,共5页
Journal of Shanxi Normal University(Social Science Edition)
基金
河南科技大学博士科研启动基金
关键词
道德判断
基础
实践理性
moral judgment
basis
practical reasoning
