摘要
目前应用博弈论对价格谈判所进行的研究大多集中于讨价还价问题,而关于报价问题的研究往往依靠定性分析。因此本文建立了一个关于报价策略的三阶段不完全信息动态博弈模型,并通过求解证明:在谈判双方信息对称的条件下,无论对买方还是卖方来说,"抢先报价"都是占优策略。在买卖双方都采取"抢先报价"策略时,报价顺序博弈的结果具有不确定性。在现实中买卖双方往往会通过各种其他手段来达到抢先报价的目的。
Current research that applies game theory to price negotiation is mainly focused on the bargaining period, and only qualitative analysis can be found as for the quoting period. In order to supply the gap this article build.s a model of 3-period incomplete information dynamic game to describe the quoting period. By solving the model the article argues that the preemptive quoting strategy is dominant for both the buyer and the seller as long as they have symmetric information. When both sides adopt the preemptive quoting strategy, the outcome is uncertain for the quoting period. In practice both the buyer and the seller tend to take various actions that may have the same effect as the preemptive quoting strategy does.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2008年第1期27-30,共4页
Shanghai Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70450001)
关键词
博弈论
价格谈判
报价策略
Game Theory
Price Negotiation
Quoting Strategies
