摘要
分析了供应链中制造商与供应商之间复杂的信息共享决策及策略互动。通过将合约风险、创新信息盗用引入博弈模型中,探讨了信息盗用风险导致信息共享与投资决策扭曲的现象,进而提出政府应该严格立法,以充分保障制造商的创新成果,从而促进信息共享,提升供应链整体绩效。
This paper analyzes the intricate information sharing decisions of manufacturer and suppler and explores the strategic interaction between the contracting parties in a supply chain. Based on a game model involved with contractual risk and misappropriation of innovative information, we demonstrate that decisions on sharing information and investment decisions are distorted when the possibility of misappropriation exists, and then put forward a suggestion that the government should legislate strictly to protect the manufacturers＂ innovative fruits, thereby to facilitate the information sharing and improve supply chain performance.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期30-34,共5页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
航空基础科学基金资助项目(04J53077)
关键词
信息不对称
盗用
信息共享
供应链绩效
asymmetric information
misappropriation
information sharing
supply chain performance
