政府管制放松与投资者保护变迁被引量：5

Deregulation and Changes of Investor Protection

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摘要该文以新比较经济学提出的"最优制度安排的状态依存性"为理论依据,提出政府管制放松是考察转型经济中投资者保护问题的一个有意义的研究视角。以我国近30年经济体制改革为背景,从改革指导思想演进以及由此带来的法律法规和改革措施等相应制度建设两个层面,考察我国投资者保护问题。文章将我国投资者保护的发展历程划分为三个阶段:侧重外商投资者保护;侧重国有出资人保护;开始更加关注市场投资者保护。 Based on the theory of new comparative economics,this paper holds that deregulation has significant impact on investor protection in transitional economics.It studies investor protection in China from the perspective of changes in reform guidelines and development of law,rules,and reform policies.It also argues that the evolution of investor protection in China can be divided into three phases:emphasis on the protection of foreign investors,emphasis on the protection of state owners,and much concern about the protection of domestic investors.

作者蔡宁魏明海

机构地区中山大学中山大学管理学院

出处《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第1期142-148,共7页 Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基金国家自然科学基金重点项目(批准号70532005) 博士后基金项目(批准号20070410864)

关键词政府管制放松投资者保护经济体制改革 deregulation investor protection economic system reform

分类号 F123 [经济管理—世界经济] F832.5 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献20

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