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无标度网络中信息交流引起的经纪人合作效应 被引量:1

Agent cooperation caused by information intercourse in the scale-free network
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摘要 根据现实生活中经纪人交往能力不同这一现象,提出并研究了一个无标度网络上的少数者博弈模型.在该模型中,将经纪人放在无标度网络中,每个节点代表一个经纪人,经纪人交往能力的大小就用节点的度来表示.引入了可调参数α,讨论了不同可调参数α下的系统方差,结果显示α存在一个最佳值αc.当α=cα时系统方差较小,说明这时系统的表现较好,系统资源得到更好的利用.并且讨论了当α=cα时,去一方人数的标准偏差同记忆容量m的函数关系,发现在记忆容量m较小时得到的结果比原始的MG模型要好. Agents have different communication capabilities in real life. To study this phenomena, a minority game on scale-free network is proposed. In this model, agents are set in scale-free networks, a node denotes an agent. The agent′s communication capability is expressed by the node′s degree. A tunable parameter a is introduced, the system′s SD is discussed in different parameter α, simulations shows that there is an optimal tunable parameter αc. When α=αc, the system′s standard deviation is smaller, which shows that the system behaves better in the whole, and the result of the model is better than the origin MG model for small m from the viewpoint of SD.
作者 邓钢 全宏俊
出处 《纺织高校基础科学学报》 CAS 2007年第4期404-407,共4页 Basic Sciences Journal of Textile Universities
基金 广东省自然科学基金资助项目(04300175)
关键词 无标度网络 少数者博弈 信息交流 经纪人合作 scale-free network minority game information transmission agent cooperation
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参考文献12

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同被引文献11

  • 1CHALLET D, ZHANG Y C. Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game[ J]. Physica A, 1997,246: 407-418.
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  • 6FRANTISEK Slanina. Harms and benefits from social imitation[ J]. Physica A,2001,299 :334-343.
  • 7QUAN Hong-jun, WANG Bing-hong, HUI P M. Effects of imitation in a competing and evolving population [ J ]. Physica A,2002,312:619-626.
  • 8QUAN Hong-jun,WANG Bing-hong, HUI P M. Self-segregation and enhanced cooperation in an evolving population through local information transmission [ J ]. Physica A,2003,321 : 300-308.
  • 9CHAU H F,CHOW F K, HO K H. Minority game with peer pressure[ J ]. Physiea A,2004,332:483-495.
  • 10QUAN Hong-jun, DENG Gang. Effect of imitation in a competing and evolving population in different situations[ J ]. Physiea A ,2007,377:625-632.

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