摘要
运用博弈论对工程机械代理商服务投入策略进行分析,建立了关于服务投入的静态和动态博弈模型,并求出了其子博弈精炼Nash均衡解。最后运用数据对模型进行了验证,证明了模型的可靠性,并对模型均衡解作了进一步探讨。研究结果对各品牌工程机械代理商制定服务投入策略具有重要的指导意义。
This paper makes an analysis on engineering machinery agent′s service payout by game theory. The static and dynamic game models of service payout are established. Then we get the resuhs of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The models are verified by data. Finally we discuss the results of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in details. The research results have great significance to make service payout strategies for engineering machinery agents.
出处
《山东交通学院学报》
CAS
2007年第4期66-70,共5页
Journal of Shandong Jiaotong University
