期刊文献+

联保贷款客户自动筛选机制研究 被引量:4

Research on the Client Auto-screening Mechanism of Joint Liability Loans
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摘要 本文通过一个简单的决策模型,对借款者的决策行为进行分析。研究发现:联保贷款内生客户筛选机制,在借款者之间信息对称的情况下,通过借款者的自我选择,能有效避免逆向选择,实现贷款客户筛选的目的。 In this paper, the borrower's decision-making behaviors are analyzed by a simple decision model. Conclusions are as follows. The client screening mechanism is endogenic in joint liability loans. Joint liability loans can avoid adverse selection and screen clients effectively by means of borrower's self selection if the distribution of its information is symmetry among borrowers.
出处 《金融理论与实践》 北大核心 2007年第11期3-5,共3页 Financial Theory and Practice
基金 国家社会科学基金(04XJY033) 云南省教育厅科学研究基金(06Y135F) 贵州财经学院博士基金(2006016)
关键词 联保贷款 客户筛选 预期收益 joint liability loans client screening expected return
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参考文献7

  • 1Conlin. Peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States[J]. Journal of development economics, 1999, (60): 249-269.
  • 2Stiglitz. Peer monitoring and credit markets[J]. World Bank Economic Review. 1990, (4), 351-366.
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  • 6Madajewicz. Capital for the poor:the effect of wealth on the optimal loan contract [R]. Working paper, 1998, Stockholm school of economics.
  • 7Aghion, Amendariz and Gollier. Peer group formation in an adverse selection model [R].Working paper, 1998, University college London.

同被引文献24

  • 1刘峰,许永辉,何田.农户联保贷款的制度缺陷与行为扭曲:黑龙江个案[J].金融研究,2006(9):171-178. 被引量:46
  • 2陈元欣,徐鸿鹏,王健.我国职业体育俱乐部融资现状、制约因素及其发展策略研究[J].成都体育学院学报,2005,31(3):17-21. 被引量:10
  • 3廖春良.集团企业关联担保问题比较研究[J].上海金融,2006(5):40-43. 被引量:3
  • 4Aghion, B., Amendariz, D., Gollier, C.Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model[C].Working Paper, University College London, 1998.
  • 5Banerjee, A., Basley, T., Guinnane, T. The Neighbor's Keeper:. the Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994,109(2).
  • 6Conrting, J. Group Lending, Moral Hazard and the Creation of Social Collateral[C].IRIS Working Paper No165, University of Maryland at College Park,1996.
  • 7Conlin, M.Peer Group Micro-lending Programs in Canada and the United States[J].Journal of Development Economies,1999,60.
  • 8Ghatak, M., Guinnane, T. The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability:Theory and Practice[J].Journal of Development Economics, 1999,60(3).
  • 9Madajewicz, M. Capital for the Poor: the Effect of Wealth on the Optimal Loan Contract[C].Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics, 1998.
  • 10Stiglitz, J. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets[J].World Bank Economic Review, 1990,4(3).

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