摘要
我国的建筑生产安全问题亟需解决。本文建立了一个以建设行政监管部门和建筑企业为参与者的安全监管博弈模型,结合我国建筑生产安全的现状,从建设行政监管部门和建筑企业的角度分析了导致我国建筑生产安全问题的主要原因,并在此基础上对建筑生产安全的监管行为提出了部分政策建议。
The problem of work safety in China's construction industry needs to be resolved as soon as possible. In this article, a static game model of construction safety supervising has been devised and analyzed, in which the two players are the governmental supervising institution and the contractor. With this game model, this paper has also explored main reasons of bad safety status in China's construction industry, and based on these analysis and exploration, some policy suggestions on construction safety supervising are proposed at the end of this article.
出处
《建筑经济》
北大核心
2007年第11期52-55,共4页
Construction Economy
关键词
建筑安全
监管
博弈
政策建议
construction safety
supervising
game theory
policy suggestions