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基于不对称信息的闭环供应链激励机制 被引量:31

Incentive Mechanism of Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Asymmetric Information
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摘要 运用委托代理理论,分别对制造商能获得回收市场真实信息和无法获得真实信息两种情况,设计了提供给第三方的线性合同的,并基于报童模型给出了制造商的最优生产决策。最后用仿真试验研究了市场情况以及回收量与需求的波动对制造商利润的影响。 Applying principle-agent theory, the paper designs linear contracts which are provided to the third party in two conditions that manufacturer can or can't get real market information, and based on newsvendor model, gives the optimal manufacturing decision. Finally, Emulation experiment was made to study the effect that market condition, fluctuation of return and demand have on manufacturer's profit.
作者 肖迪 黄培清
出处 《工业工程与管理》 2007年第4期11-14,共4页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70372056)
关键词 闭环供应链 不对称信息 激励机制 生产决策 Closed Loop Supply Chain Asymmetric Information Incentive Mechanism Production Decision
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参考文献5

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