摘要
基于我国各地市场化进程中政府对企业干预程度的差异,本文研究政府角色转变对不同所有权性质企业权益资本成本的影响。政府减少对企业的干预会产生两个效应:一方面,增强企业经营行为和经营环境的可预期性,从而降低权益资本成本,即"可预期效应";另一方面,会减少对企业的保护,增加企业的风险,提高权益资本成本,即"保护效应"。两个效应的强弱与企业所有权性质密切相关。我们的研究发现,最终控制人是地方政府的企业,"保护效应"比较强,抵消了"可预期效应"的作用,政府角色转变对权益资本成本没有显著影响;对非国有企业,政府保护比较弱,因此在"可预期效应"的作用下,权益资本成本随着政府对经济干预程度减小而降低。
This paper studies the relationship between role of government and cost of equity in Chinese security market.Reducing the intervention from government on the firms' operation will have two contrary effects:one is to increase the predictability of operation behaviors and business environment and consequently decreases the cost of equity.The other is the cost of equity will be increased without the government protection.The strength of the two effects is decided by the ownership property.This paper found that there is no significant influence of transferring government role on cost of equity because of the tradeoff between the two effects above while ultimate controller is local government.However,for non-state sample,the two variables have shown a negative relationship significantly because only predictability effect is working.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期61-67,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70572029)
教育部新世纪优秀人才培养计划的资助
