摘要
国有企业与民营企业的代理成本的表现形式是不同的,不同的代理成本造成了两类公司不同的控制权收益,进而影响了并购效率。国有企业主导的并购,管理费用增加较多,降低了并购效率;而民营企业主导的并购,通常伴随着大股东通过关联交易转移资产,也降低了并购效率。为提高我国企业并购的效率,应针对不同类型的公司采取不同的监管策略。
Reality and theory research results indicate the efficiency of China's M&A has great difference from west countries'.On the west mature markets,M&A brings great cumulative abnormal return(CAR) to the target,but CAR is very little in our country.This paper analyses the agency cost of SOEs and non-SOEs.We find they have different types of agency cost,which influences the private benefit of control and M&A efficiency.We suggest that M&A leaded by SOEs enhanced administration expenditure and impaired M&A efficiency.Furthermore,M&A leaded by non-SOEs enhanced related party transaction,and decreased M&A efficiency.Our conclusions show government should carry out different strategies to improve M&A efficiency in China.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期66-72,共7页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
股权特征
控制权收益
并购效率
企业
Ownership Structure
Benefits of Control
Merger and Acquisition Efficiency
