摘要
技术交易中,专利权人与竞争者(潜在的侵权者)之间是典型的主从对策关系,而行动的先后顺序对双方的最终收益会产生重大地影响。本文分别建立一主一从和一主多从的模型,分析研究专利权人面对单个侵权者或者多个侵权者时,各方的均衡策略。通过一主一从模型,我们发现,只有在竞争者先行动的前提下才会出现"侵权倾向与罚金数正相关"的特殊现象;通过一主多从模型的分析,发现专利权人的"主方优势"比较明显,而竞争者只有在先行动时,才能争取主动,促使专利权人的打击力度尽量小,从而使自己的收益尽量高。
In the technology transaction, the relationship between patent holders and competitors （potential infringers） is a typical leader - follower strategy. And the sequence of actions influences the payoff of both sides greatly. Models of ＂leader - one follower＂ and ＂leader- multiple followers＂ are set up respecti -vely, in order to analyze the strategies and equilibria in situations that a patent holder faces single or multiple competitors. According to the ＂leader -one follower＂ model, the corollary ＂likelihood of entry increases with the penalty＂ can only exist if the competitor acts preemptively. And results from the ＂leader -multiple followers＂ model indicates that the ＂leading advantage＂ lies definitely with the holder and that competitors need preemption to maximize their payoff by stimulating the holder to mitigate the litigation.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期100-104,共5页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371035)
非瓦尔拉斯均衡条件下的资产组合风险价值模型。时间:2004-01--2006-12
关键词
专利交易
专利侵权
主从对策
纳什均衡
patent transaction
patent infringement
leader - follower strategy
Nash equilibrium
