董事会独立性、盈余稳健性与投资者保护被引量：55

Board Independence,Conservatism and Investor Protection

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摘要有关董事会通过对财务会计过程的影响而发挥治理功能,一直倍受关注。该文考察了董事会独立性对公司盈余稳健性的影响。对中国A股上市公司实证分析的结果表明,董事会独立性的提高有利于增强公司盈余稳健性,一方面延迟了盈余对好消息的反映,有助于保护全体投资者利益,提高市场效率;另一方面加快了盈余对坏消息的反映,有助于保护外部中小股东的利益,体现市场公平。 Considering the fairness and efficiency of the market respectively, this paper examines how board independence protects the investors through its influence on corporate earnings conservatism. Results from the listed companies indicate that board independence is negatively related to the timeliness of good news reflected in earnings, which could increase the wealth of all investors, while positively related to the timeliness of bad news reflected in earnings, which could protect the outside investors.

作者陈胜蓝魏明海

机构地区中山大学管理学院

出处《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第2期96-102,共7页 Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基金国家自然科学基金重点项目<产权保护导向的会计控制研究>(批准号:70532005)

关键词董事会独立性盈余稳健性投资者保护中国A股上市公司市场效率市场公平 board independence conservatism investor protection

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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