摘要
本文将家族化水平、大股东监督与公司绩效纳入一个统一的框架体系进行研究。建立了在不同的家族化管理水平下,大股东监督对公司绩效影响的模型,并以2004年深、沪324家家族控股上市公司为样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明,大股东监督对公司绩效作用的强弱受到家族化管理水平高低的影响。
This paper anaysis the relationship between the large shareholder monitoring and corporate performance in different the level of family govenance based on a sample of 324 listed firms of family controlled in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Exchange. This paper finds out that the relationship between large shareholder monitoring and corporate performance is different in different the level of family govenance. In the low level of family govenance, large shareholder monitoring is remarkable positively related the corporate performance. Large shareholder monitoring is substituted for family govenance in lower level of family govenance. We suggest that family business shouldnot scatter ownership, but develop large shareholders being monitoring effect.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期13-16,共4页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
家族化水平
大股东监督.公司绩效
level of family governance
large shareholder monitoring
corporate performance
