我国财政分权的特征与改革取向被引量：13

Main Features of Fiscal Decentralization in China and Reform Orientation

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摘要我国财政分权是“自上而下”的，强调中央政府对资源的掌握和在宏观调控中的主导作用。而地方政府很大程度上作为中央政府的代理人出现，其提供公共服务的成本和收益之间缺乏必要的联系。解决自下而上的地方居民需求．以及与自上而下的行政权力约束矛盾的有效途径，是使自下而上建立的地方政府能力与自上而下的分权策略协调一致．包括完善转移支付体系及尽量体现地方政府公共服务成本与收益之间的联系。 China＇s incremental fiscal decentralization reform was carried out from central to local, which strengthens central government＇s dominant function of resources command and macro-control. While＇ to great extent, local government works as central government＇s surrogate, so the benefit of providing public service is unequal to their cost. The best way to solve the conflict of local residents＇ demands and administration power constraints is to keep consistent between local government＇s capability and fiscal decentralization strategy, which includs perfecting the system of payment of transfer based on formula, trying to embody the relationship between cost and benefit of local government＇ s providing of public services.

作者谷成

机构地区东北财经大学财税学院

出处《改革》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第1期38-44,共7页 Reform

基金本文系作者主持的教育部人文社科项目“财政分权下的中国财产税改革问题研究”（项目编号：06JC790003）的研究成果.

关键词财政分权地方政府公共服务转移支付 fiscal decentralization, local government, public service, payment of transfer

分类号 F812.2 [经济管理—财政学]

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参考文献12

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