摘要
本文利用2002-2004年沪深两市 A 股上市公司的样本数据,实证分析了控股股东型上市公司的关联交易规模与公司内部治理机制之间的关系。研究结果发现:(1)控股股东的持股比例越高和其控制公司的资产规模越大,则越偏好于利用更多的关联交易向上市公司输送利益,同时也存在利用关联交易"隧道挖掘"上市公司的行为;(2)公司高层管理人员的薪酬激励可以抑制关联交易规模;(3)董事会规模对关联交易和公司绩效没有显著影响;(4)公司设置独立董事对关联交易行为的监督不明显,但初步显现对提高公司绩效的影响。
This article empirically studies the relationships between related party transactions and corporate governance inside mechanism of controlling shareholder＇s listed companies by using data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Markets during 2002 - 2004. The thesis finds that （ 1 ） the controlling shareholders hold more shareholding ratio and they control more assets of listed companies, and they favorite transport profit to listed companies using more related party transactions. Meanwhile, controlling shareholder may tunnel profit from listed companies with related party transactions at large; （2） A stimulus to executive compensation may restrain the scale of related party transactions ; （3） the size of director board has no significant influence on performance and related party transactions of listed companies;（4） independency directors have no obvious effect on supervising related party transactions, but it is emerging that independency directors promote the performance of listed companies.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期79-89,共11页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70372041)。
关键词
关联交易
公司治理机制
控股股东
利益输送
隧道挖掘
related party transactions
corporate governance mechanism
controlling shareholder
propping
tunneling
