摘要
随着经济增长点的多元化以及产业结构的日趋合理,我国企业发展在实现产出增长的同时也带来了严重的环境问题。以企业融资结构与企业环境依存度为切入点,运用Brander和Lewis的寡头垄断博弈分析框架,可以揭示经济增长的区域差异、融资偏好、污染税制度以及企业最优污染治理水平等变量之间的相互关系。通过对不同污染收费制度下的企业行为的比较分析,可以证明在不同的收费制度下,企业自利行为所导致的企业融资偏好以及对环境的污染程度会有所不同。
With the diversification of China＇ s economic growth and the gradual rationalization of her industrial structure, serious environmental problems arise while enterprises are trying to increase their output. This paper takes enterprise financing structure and dependency of enterprises on environment as a point of departure and employs the analytical framework of Brander and Lewis＇ s （1986） Oligopoly Game to reveal the relationship between such variables as regional difference of economic growth, enterprise financing structure, pollution tax regulation and level of optimal control of pollution. It also compares the different behaviors of enterprises under different pollution tax regulations and concludes that under different pollution tax regulatiom the financing preference and the degree of environmental ponution brought about by the self-seeking behaviors of enterprises are also different.
出处
《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期22-29,共8页
Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
基金
教育部人文社科基地重大项目(05JJD790026)
关键词
区域差异
融资偏好
环境依存度
regional difference, financing preference, dependency of enterprises on environment
