摘要
本文运用不完全信息动态博弈,分析了中央政府对国有银行进行救助对国有银行不良贷款的影响。结果表明,中央政府救助会增加国有银行不良贷款形成的概率。
In this paper, we analyzed the influence of central government assistance on non - performing loans of state - owned banks by means of incomplete information dynamic game. We considered that central goveminent assistance will increase the formation probability of non - performing loans of state - owned banks in China.
出处
《特区经济》
北大核心
2006年第12期22-23,共2页
Special Zone Economy
关键词
不完全信息动态博弈
中央政府救助
国有银行
不良贷款
incomplete information dynamic game
central government assistance
state - owned banks
non - performing loans
