摘要
自利偏好和公平心理偏好都会影响人们的行为决策。对具有公平心理偏好的行为人,即使生产过程是完全独立的,最优契约也是同时取决于个人产出和他人产出的联合契约,而不是仅取决于个人产出的独立契约,结果标准博弈论的充分统计量原则不再成立。与没有考虑公平心理偏好的标准情形相比,公平心理偏好改变了最优契约的结构形式,并且提高了激励效率。因此,采取性格测试等手段积极识别员工的公平心理偏好强弱,对企业制定恰当的薪酬激励制度具有重要意义。
Economic game experiments have been proving that besides self-interest there are fairness preferences, which will result in disutility from unfair allocation of material payoffs. Self-lnterest and fairness preferences will both influence behaviors. For agents endowed with fairness preferences, even when the production is independent totally, the optimal incentive contracts are joint incentive contracts determined By Both one's own output and others' instead of independent contracts relying only on one's own output, and so the .sufficient statistics principle of standard game theory is no longer right. Comparing to the standard incentive contracts without considering fairness preferences, the structure of optimal contracts are changed and incentive efficieneies are promoted. So, it is very important for enterprises to screen the fairness preferences of employees by means of personality evaluation when designing optimal incentive systems.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第9期32-37,共6页
Systems Engineering
关键词
联合契约
公平心理偏好
激励
行为博弈论
Joint Contracts
Fairness Preferences
Incentive
Behavioral Game Theory