摘要
对公司投资者和创业企业家之间的信息困境进行了分析,在此基础上建立了二者的信息博弈模型,并运用进化博弈理论分析了公司创业投资市场主体的博弈过程和进化稳定策略,讨论了不同强度的知识产权保护环境对博弈的影响。最后,对如何规范市场主体行为提出了建议。
In this paper the dilemma of information release between corporate investors and entrepreneurs in corporate venture capital (CVC) market is described, based on which we construct an evolutionary game model. Then we analyze the evolutionary process of participators of CVC market and get evolutionarily stable strategies of the game under different intellectual property rights protection environment. In conclusion, we give some beneficial results and suggestions.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期155-159,共5页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
关键词
公司创业投资
信息困境
进化博弈
进化稳定策略
corporate venture capital
dilemma of information release
evolutionary game theory
evolutionarily stable strategy