摘要
本文检验了国家控制、政府干预、银行债务与资金侵占之间的关系。研究发现政府干预主要加剧了国家控制的上市公司的控股股东对上市公司资金的侵占；只有当上市公司受国家控制且受政府干预多时,银行债务才显著地加剧了控股股东对上市公司的资金侵占。结果表明,在我国,国家控制及政府干预显著地加剧了控股股东与小股东及银行债权人之间的利益冲突。从这一点上说,国家控制及政府干预不利于社会经济效率的提高,而这与代理学派与政治学派对国有企业的解释一致。
This paper empirically investigates the relationship among state control, government intervention, bank loan, and asset appropriation. We find that government intervention exacerbates the asset appropriation in firms controlled by the state; bank loan significantly facilitates asset appropriation only when the firm is controlled by the state and has excessive government interference. The result shows that state control and government intervention in China significantly exacerbate the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and small shareholders, and between controlling shareholders and bank debtors. Thus we infer that state control and government intervention are not conducive to the improvement of social and economic efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the studies of state-owned enterprises using agent theory.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期90-98,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
香港研究资助局项目(CUHK4437/04H)
关键词
国家控制
政府干预
银行债务
资金侵占
state control
government intervention
bank loan
asset appropriation
