摘要
中国股市独特的制度变迁路径和基础环境确立了政府的隐性担保人角色。这一角色引发及强化了投资者与政府、上市公司和国企与政府、证券公司与政府的一系列市场博弈。目前的许多市场消极现象都可由此得到说明。政府逐步解除隐性担保契约、摆脱尴尬角色定位的关键出路便是响应和满足市场的创新需求。
The unique way of system vicissitude and the basic enviroranent of China＇s stock market established the role of implicit guarantor by Chinese government, which initiated and strengthened a series of market game between government and investors, listed companies, state - owned enterprises, securities companies. At present, many market negative phenomena can be explained by above reasons. The essential outlet for the government to gradually relieve the implicit guarantee contract and get rid of the awkward role is to respond and satisfy the innovation demand in market.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第7期28-34,共7页
Finance & Economics
关键词
政府隐性担保契约
市场博弈
创新
government implicit guarantee contract
market game
innovation
