摘要
针对我国中小企业融资难的难题,利用博弈论和信息经济学的有关理论知识,从定量的角度深入分析了中小企业融资中逆向选择和道德风险的形成过程和机理,从理论上论证了中小企业融资难的重要原因在于中小企业与金融机构之间信息分布的非对称,在此基础上并给出了降低或规避逆向选择和道德风险的途径.
The financial problem of small and medium enterprises is a main problem in our economy. According to game theory and information economy, the paper gives a detailed analysis about adverse selection and moral hazard. The reason of financial problem is theoretically caused by asymmetric information between small and medium enterprises and finance agency. Finally, the paper gives some feasible methods to reduce or prevent, adverse selection and moral hazard.
出处
《大学数学》
北大核心
2006年第3期60-66,共7页
College Mathematics
关键词
逆向选择
道德风险
中小企业
博弈模型
adverse selection
moral hazard
small and medium enterprise
game model.
