摘要
在党的纪律条例和行政法规之中,领导责任是问责制的核心组成部分。领导责任和直接责任相对,在事故发生之后,如何确定非直接的领导责任,在现行的理论中并没有得到阐释。从目前的规则和实施来看,领导责任不仅属于政治责任,而且也是法律责任,是对由于懈怠和不作为,和事故之间存在“非直接因果关系”的一种新型责任。公法上并不存在着“非直接责任”的司法审查,而私法的侵权模式也不能通过法院对行政机关的自由裁量进行审查,由此,领导责任类似于公司法的“督导系统”的责任,包括“红色警报”和“警察巡逻”的事前义务,以及作为免责事由的“业务判断规则”。同时,责任追究和组织的激励之间存在着紧密关系,政府组织的公共性也要求有更广泛的免责事由,相对于此,现有的领导责任问责制有改进的必要。
Leadership responsibility is a special feature of the Chinese political system. It is defined as the liability of public officers' nonfeasance in contrast to the direct liability of malfeasance. However, existing theories provide no account of how to decide the indirect responsibility of leadership. According to existing case explorations, we find that this responsibility is not just a political responsibility, but also a legal liability. The author points out that leadership responsibility is a new concept in legal theory. It is a new type of responsibility that decides the“indirect relationship”between nonfeasance and the accident. As there is no“indirect responsibility”in public law, and it is not possible for the courts to convict administrative organs by applying violations in private law, leadership responsibility is similar to that of the“supervision system”in corporate law, which includes the duties of“red alert”and“police patrol”before the event and“business judgment rule”as the exoneration rule. In the meantime, as accountability is closely related to the incentive mechanism of an organization, the nature of government as a public organization calls for wider application of the exoneration rule. In this regard, the current system of the accountability of leadership responsibility needs to be improved.
出处
《中国社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期136-148,共13页
Social Sciences in China
