摘要
作为纳税人的社会公众与政府之间本质上是一种委托代理关系。在部门预算中,该委托代理关系表现出多环节的委托授权链条。针对目前政府部门预算中由于信息不对称、监督弱化而导致的腐败和共谋问题,提出了解决代理问题的对策。
This paper first attempts to apply the theory of trust and agency to study the problems of government budget. The theory reveals the relationship between the government and the public as well as tax payers, in essence, is a kind of trust and agency, which embodies multi-link authorizing chains in departmental budget. In order to solve the problems of corruption and malpractice by information asymmetry and weakened supervision, the author puts forward some proposals to perfect the existing supervision system.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
北大核心
2006年第3期74-76,共3页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
委托代理
部门预算
监督体系
trust and agency
departmental budget
supervision system
