摘要
信息传递理论和代理成本理论认为,在激励契约中,负债和现金股利可以相互替代,但是现实中负债与现金股利却共存于激励契约。文章通过模型推演,证明债务支付承诺的“刚性”在控制道德风险方面存在优势,但在传递信息方面存在不足。而现金股利支付承诺则具有较大“弹性”,该弹性能提高信息传递能力,以改善控制逆向选择(隐藏信息)和道德风险(隐藏行动)的效率,从而使负债与现金股利具有互补性,为负债与现金股利共存于公司的激励契约提供了合理的解释。
The theory of information transition and agency cost argues that debt and dividend in incentive contract can mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, and can be replaced by each other. Then, why do debt and dividend lie in the incentive contracts simultaneously？ This paper illustrates that the rigidity of debt has an advantage in controlling moral hazard, but is not enough in eliminating adverse selection. The dividend commitment however, boasts a greater flexibility in managerial incentive contract which results in an improved ability of controlling agency problem. Therefore, debt and dividend supplement each other well, which provides a reasonable explanation for the co-existence of both in the incentive contract.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期65-74,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
