摘要
本文在委托─代理理论的框架内分析了地方政府的代理行为,指出地方政府官员对控制权回报的追求以及地方官员工作绩效的选择性显示,会导致地方政府过分关注辖区经济规模的快速扩张,偏离建设和谐社会所要求的综合发展目标。为了减轻地方政府代理行为的偏差,本文提出了加强地方人大建设、推进政务公开和建立科学的地方政府官员绩效评价体系等建议。
Based on morden agency theory, this paper focuses on discussing local government＇s behaviour, Official＇s persuit for private rights of control, accompanied by the selected signaling of official＇s performance, possibly causes local government to unduly concern the rapid increase of economic scale, resulting in varying from the comprehensive goal of the construction of harmonious society. In order to reduce the behavioural distortion of local government, the paper puts forward three proposals of strengthening the function of local People＇s Congress System, improving the publicity of administrative behavior and establishing scientifical evaluating system of local officials＇ performance.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期100-104,共5页
Chinese Public Administration
