摘要
在现象问题上,本质主义的失误就在于,把现象仅仅理解为物理现象、意识现象,而忽视了情感现象的独立自存性。布伦塔诺等现象学家虽关注并赋予现象以较高的哲学地位,但都未发现一个新的独立自存的价值现象领域。舍勒和哈特曼虽发现、证明并确立了一个与事实世界并立的价值世界,并使哲学的人本主义深化为伦理学的人本主义,但没有从价值现象学的角度对之进行系统考察。事实上,价值现象具有与物理现象完全不同的特质,是哲学真正的生命绿地,是人之所以成为人而存在的精神基地。
The deficiency of essentialism in the problem of phenomenon is in its definition of the phenomenon as physical and ideological, ignoring the independent existence of affective phenomenon. Phenomenologists such as Brentano didn＇t find the new independent field of value phenomenon, although they put phenomenology in a higher philosophical status. While having discovered the value world coexisting with the factual world and deepened philosophical humanism into ethic humanism, Scheler and Hartmann didn＇t give a systematic study of it from the perspective of value phenomenology. Actually, different from physical phenomenon, value phenomenon is the living source of philosophy and the spiritual base of human being.
出处
《西南师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期104-107,共4页
Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
现象
本质主义
物理现象
情感现象
价值
phenomenon
essentialism
physical phenomenon
affective phenomenon
value
