摘要
本文对山西近年来煤炭经济繁荣背景下煤炭开采中的各种短期行为及道德风险进行了调查、分析。本文的基本结论是:第一,煤焦企业的短期套利导致投入的非产出性质;第二,某些官员的短期套利导致官煤勾结,煤炭经济效益的提高;第三,双方的短期套利行为组合形成了煤炭资源浪费严重和安全事故频发的福利损失。第四,本文据此提出建立长期激励约束机制制约短期行为的若干建议,包括发挥市场退出权作用,整合全省煤炭资源,实施煤炭战略重组等。
This paper studies the myopic arbitrage between coal mine owners and officials in Shanxi Province. Conclusions are as follows.Firstly ,coal firms＇ myopic arbitrage leads to nonproductive input.Secondly,officials＇ myopic arbitrage leads to collusion between coal mine owners and policy executives. Thirdly, the collusion results in resource waste and frequent accidents. Finally, It is needed to introduce longnm incentives to restrict myopic arbitrage.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期183-190,共8页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
短期套利
非产出性活动
煤炭经济
myopic arbitrage, nonproductive activities, coal economy
