摘要
本文研究我国公司债券市场上的强制担保要求和投资者定位之间的关系,为此构建的理论模型表明:发债企业得到的担保越多,它所选择的投资项目风险越大;取消担保后,投资者的风险识别能力越强,发债企业选择的投资项目风险越小。本文对发展我国公司债券市场提出如下政策建议:减少政府干预,取消强制担保要求;明确投资者定位,大力发展机构投资者;深化商业银行改革,促进银行体系和债券市场的协调发展。
This paper studies the relation between mandatory guarantee by the government and investor position in China＇ s corporate bond market, A comparative static model is established and it shows that the risk of investment project chosen by corporate bond issuer is positively correlated with the amount of guarantee required by the government, and it is negatively correlated with the risk management capability of investors ff mandatory guarantee is abolished. Based on these insights, this paper suggests that government intervention and mandatory guarantee be abolished, the main stream of corporate bond investors be focused on institutional investors, and the banking system and bond market be developed in a coordinated way.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期67-75,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
公司债券
强制担保要求
投资者定位
corporate bond, mandatory guarantee, investor position
